Sticks and Stones, The Words That Hurt: Entrenched Stereotypes Eight Years after 9/11 by Aziz, Sahar F.
City University of New York Law Review 
Volume 13 Issue 1 
Winter 2009 
Sticks and Stones, The Words That Hurt: Entrenched Stereotypes 
Eight Years after 9/11 
Sahar F. Aziz 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
Follow this and additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/clr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sahar F. Aziz, Sticks and Stones, The Words That Hurt: Entrenched Stereotypes Eight Years after 9/11, 13 
N.Y. City L. Rev. 33 (2009). 
Available at: 10.31641/clr130102 
The CUNY Law Review is published by the Office of Library Services at the City University of New York. For more 
information please contact cunylr@law.cuny.edu. 
STICKS AND STONES, THE WORDS THAT
HURT: ENTRENCHED STEREOTYPES
EIGHT YEARS AFTER 9/11
Sahar F. Aziz*
In the realm of adults, name-calling is often a fact of life that
one simply brushes off like water rolls off a duck’s back. At some
point, however, racial slurs and ethnic epithets hurled at employ-
ees constitute actionable discrimination rooted in palpable and en-
trenched stereotypes. In the case of Muslims, Arabs, and South
Asians, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks not only caused an
upsurge in hatred, violence, and discrimination, but also en-
trenched preexisting negative stereotypes. Targeted law enforce-
ment efforts and media images stereotyping dark-skinned, bearded
males with Arabic-sounding names as representing the primary
threat to the national security of the United States contribute to
racial, national origin, and religious harassment in the workplace.
In the years immediately following the September 11th terror-
ist attacks, hate crimes and other forms of discrimination against
these communities were on the rise at a troubling rate. For the last
months of 2001, the FBI reported a 1500% increase in hate crimes
against “people of Middle Eastern descent, Muslims, and South
Asian Sikhs, who are often mistaken for Muslim” from 28 in 2000
to 481 in 2001.1 The New York City Police Department received
117 reports of hate crimes against Arab- and Muslim-Americans in
the first six months after the attacks, compared to an average of
seven hate crime reports per year before 2001.2 The American-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (“ADC”) reported over 700
violent incidents targeting Arab Americans, Muslims, and South
Asians or those perceived as such in the first nine weeks following
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Civil Liberties, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Ms. Aziz was also an associate
in the employment and civil rights practice at Cohen, Milstein, Sellers & Toll PLLC,
and at Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale & Dorr. She graduated cum laude from the
University of Texas School of Law, served as an Associate Editor on the Texas Law
Review, and holds a Master of Arts in Middle East Studies from the University of
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1 Darryl Fears, Hate Crimes Against Arabs Surge, FBI Finds, WASH. POST, Nov. 26,
2002, at A02.
2 Susan Sachs, A Nation Challenged: Relations; For Many American Muslims, Com-
plaints of Quiet but Persistent Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2002, at A16.
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the September 11th terrorist attacks. ADC also documented several
murders, 165 violent incidents from January 1, 2002 to October 11,
2002, over eighty cases of illegal and discriminatory removal of pas-
sengers from aircrafts based on the passenger’s perceived ethnicity,
and over 800 cases of employment discrimination against Arab
Americans from September 11, 2001 to October 11, 2002.3 Simi-
larly, the Council on American-Islamic Relations reported 1717
complaints of discrimination by Muslims in the first six months af-
ter September 11.4
Notwithstanding the passage of eight years, “post-9/11 dis-
crimination” persists, most profoundly in the workplace. While the
volume of cases has seemingly decreased, negative stereotypes of
Muslims and Arabs have become entrenched into popular culture
and consequently more prevalent in the workplace.5 One need
only recall the 2008 presidential elections where allegations that
Barack Obama was a Muslim or Arab were in effect racial slurs and
ethnic epithets.6 Months after Barack Obama’s inauguration, anti-
Muslim sentiment continues in the form of the growing “Birther”
movement challenging the validity of President Obama’s Hawaiian
birth certificate, and ultimately the legitimacy of his presidency, on
grounds that he is a closeted Muslim born in a Muslim country.7
Despite the spuriousness of the allegations, the popularity of the
Birther movement suggests that suspicion and distrust of Muslims
in America will continue for years to come.
Litigation of civil rights employment claims, both under Title
VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq, offers an effective means of coun-
tering entrenched bias in the workplace. In addition to providing
remedies to plaintiffs harmed by employment discrimination, such
3 AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM., REPORT ON HATE CRIMES AND DIS-
CRIMINATION AGAINST ARAB AMERICANS: THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 BACKLASH, SEPTEMBER
11, 2001 – OCTOBER 11, 2002 7 (2003), http://www.adc.org/PDF/hcr02.pdf.
4 COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS, American Muslims: One Year After
9/11, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20041020010807/www.cair-net.org/
911report/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2009).
5 See, e.g., COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS, THE STATUS OF MUSLIM CIVIL
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (2007), http://www.cair-net.org/pdf/2007-Civil-
Rights-Report.pdf (documenting 2,467 civil rights complaints in 2006, and finding
that, of the 2,467 total reports, the second most common place of occurrence for civil
rights violations was the workplace).
6 See Isabel Macdonald & Steve Rendall, ‘Secret Muslims,’ Open Bigotry: Islamophobia
in the 2008 Presidential Campaign, EXTRA!, Nov./Dec. 2008, available at http://www.fair.
org/index.php?page=3649; Elisabeth Bumiller, McCain Draws Line on Attacks as Crowds
Cry ‘Fight Back,’ N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2008, at A12 (responding to suspicions that
Obama is an Arab with “no ma’am, he’s a decent family man”).
7 Amy Hollyfield, Obama’s birth certificate: Final chapter, June 27, 2008, http://www.
politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2008/jun/27/obamas-birth-certificate-part-ii/.
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cases offer a powerful disincentive to employers who permit their
workplace to become infested with insidious stereotypes against
Muslims, Arabs, or South Asians.
Accordingly, this Article provides the legal framework for pur-
suing such claims. Part I lays out the theoretical backdrop of how
immigrants and racial minorities have historically been targeted as
a result of a misguided Eurocentric definition of “American.”
Though Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians have historically exper-
ienced the adverse effects of such narrow and exclusive definitions
of citizenship, the terrorist attacks directed long-standing nativist
bias to these groups and permanently racialized them. Part II dis-
cusses how governmental racial profiling and targeted law enforce-
ment action legitimizes private bias that is ultimately manifested as
workplace harassment. To highlight the misconceptions and falla-
cies perpetuated by the racial slurs, Part III offers a general intro-
duction to the Arab, Muslim, Middle Eastern, Sikh, and South
Asian communities in the United States. Part IV discusses the avail-
ability of national origin and ethnic origin as a basis of liability
under Title VII. Part V explains the theories of liability under
which a plaintiff may pursue a hostile work environment claim on
the basis of national origin or ethnic origin. Included is an analysis
of the myriad of cases filed since September 11, 2001 that involve
allegations of discrimination against Arabs, Muslims, Middle Eas-
terners, Sikhs, or South Asians. Finally, the Article concludes by
arguing that national or ethnic origin harassment expressed
through accusations of being a terrorist, ethnic slurs about an em-
ployee’s Arab heritage, and allegations of condoning violence
based on a profession of the Islamic faith are all results of the
racialization of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians as the “terrorist
other” and the entrenchment of stereotypes that have surpassed
being merely backlash.
I. RACIALIZATION OF MUSLIMS, ARABS, AND SOUTH ASIANS
Since the nation’s inception, the American psyche has strug-
gled with its conflicted relationship with immigrants. On the one
hand, the nation has welcomed—and in the case of African Ameri-
cans coercively appropriated—the labor of people from every con-
tinent. On the other hand, the Eurocentric vision of Americanism
has tenaciously dominated the definition of the “American.”8 As
race and citizenship become proxies for (dis)loyalty to the nation,
8 Bill Ong Hing, Vigilante Racism: The De-Americanization of Immigrant America, 7
MICH. J. RACE & L. 441, 452-54 (2002).
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people of color and immigrants are viewed as potentially danger-
ous and presumptively suspect.9 Such bias is most glaring in the
American criminal justice system where police are conditioned to
view these groups with suspicion, thereby resulting in whites receiv-
ing warnings and second chances while blacks are arrested and im-
prisoned at the first instance of wrongdoing.10 The September 11th
attacks redirected preexisting nativist biases against all people of
color to Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians as they became subject
to a concerted de-Americanization process.
As Leti Volpp has stated, the September 11th terrorist attacks
facilitated the construction of a new identity category that groups
together persons who appear Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim and
identifies them as terrorists while dis-identifying them as citizens.11
I would further add South Asians to this category. These individu-
als are categorized to be identified as terrorists and dis-identified as
citizens. Notwithstanding an individual’s status as United States citi-
zen, members of this group are forever foreign.12 The discrimina-
tors are often ignorant of the difference between these different
racial and/or ethnic groups. Nor do they know whether being a
Muslim is a religious or racial identity. The result is a conflation of
the racial Arab or South Asian with the religious category of Mus-
lim coupled with the misperception that Islam is a radical and vio-
lent religion. Muslim-looking people are targeted in what can be
characterized as “religiously-driven racial discrimination.”13
A. Negative Stereotypes Predated the September 11th Terrorist Attacks
Stereotypical ethnic epithets disparaging employees of Arab
and South Asian descent predated the September 11th terrorist at-
tacks. Derogatory slurs such as “camel jockeys,” “sand nigger,” and
“Scum Arab,” have been the basis of numerous national origin har-
9 See Victor C. Romero, Proxies for Loyalty in Constitutional Immigration Law: Citizen-
ship and Race After September 11, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 871 (2003).
10 Id. at 874 (citing studies conducted by sociologist Jessica Mitford wherein she
concludes that the “criminal type” is “a social creation, etched by the dominant class
and ethnic prejudices of a given society”); see ACLU & THE RIGHTS WORKING GROUP,
THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC PROFILING IN THE UNITED STATES: A FOLLOW-
UP REPORT TO THE U.N. COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL PROFILING 9
(2009), http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/humanrights/cerd_finalreport.pdf (highlighting
“[r]acial profiling by law enforcement, and the correlate criminalization of people of
color”).
11 See Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002).
12 Hing, supra note 8, at 442-44 (describing the de-Americanization of Muslims,
Arabs, and South Asians after 9/11).
13 Margaret Chon & Donna E. Arzt, Walking While Muslim, 68 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 215, 216 (2005).
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assment claims brought by Arab employees.14 In Amirmokri v. Balti-
more Gas and Electric Co., an Iranian immigrant testified at trial that
during a six-month period, his supervisor and co-workers “made
almost daily derogatory references to his Iranian national origin,
calling him ‘the local terrorist,’ a ‘camel jockey,’ ‘the Ayatollah,’
and ‘the Emir of Waldorf,’” which is the town where he resided.15
In Al-Salem v. Bucks County Water & Sewer Authority, the plaintiff was
a United States citizen who emigrated from Libya and alleged that
his employer subjected him to a hostile work environment because
of, among other things, his national origin.16 He alleged that his
supervisor’s supervisor had called him a “camel jockey” and a “sand
nigger” repeatedly during a six-month period.17 These cases,
among others, demonstrate how negative stereotypes against Mus-
lims, Arabs, and South Asians predated the September 11th terror-
ist attacks. After September 11, the stereotypes and public bias
became more ubiquitous and further entrenched.
B. Stereotypes Became Entrenched After September 11
The term “terrorist” has now become a racialized construct in
which persons, especially men, perceived as Arab or South Asian
are classified as “terrorist others.” This racialized construct is re-
peatedly reflected in the racial slurs and epithets directed at em-
ployees that are or perceived to be Arab, South Asian, and/or
Muslim. While deplorable on their face, such racist stereotypes are
often accepted by judges as a regrettable, but expected response to
the September 11th terrorist attacks.18 When state action involves
national security policies and practices that apply exclusively to
Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians, it is no surprise that judges mis-
interpret racial slurs and epithets as protected political view-
points.19 Moreover, such inflammatory stereotypes are reflected in
14 Nader v. Brunalli Constr. Co., No. 98-2085, 2002 WL 724597, at *1-3 (D. Conn.
Mar. 26, 2002) (calling plaintiff a “Scum Arab” and telling him to “go back where
[he] came from”); Boutros v. Canton Reg’l Transit Auth., 997 F.2d 198, 201 (6th Cir.
1993) (calling the plaintiff a “camel jockey,” a “camel rider,” a “rich Arab,” and telling
him to “go back” to Syria); Yasin v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 07 C 1266, 2009
WL 1210620, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 4, 2009) (calling plaintiff a “sand nigger”).
15 60 F.3d 1126, 1128-29 (4th Cir. 1995).
16 No. 97-6843, 1999 WL 167729, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 1999).
17 Id. at *2.
18 See Muneer I. Ahmed, A Rage Shared By Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as
Crimes of Passion, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1262 (2004) (analogizing hate crimes against
Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians to crimes of passion, in which the racial violence
needs little explanation in light of the severity of the terrorist attacks and the govern-
ment’s consequent collective punishment of these communities).
19 Hussain v. Highgate Hotels, Inc., 2005 FED App. 0199N, 258 (6th Cir.) (holding
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polls taken as recently as 2009 where 53% of Americans have a “not
too favorable” view of Islam.20 Similarly, in a 2006 poll, 44% of
Americans believe Muslims are too extreme in their religious be-
liefs, 22% of Americans would not want a Muslim as a neighbor,
and less than half of Americans believe American Muslims are loyal
to the United States.21
Many years after the terrorist attacks, such xenophobic senti-
ments manifest themselves in the mistreatment of Muslims in the
workplace as well as the public sphere. In 2006, Muslim Iraqi plain-
tiffs in Ridha v. Texas A&M University System alleged that defendants
humiliated them and ridiculed their Muslim faith by throwing
animal urine and feces at plaintiffs’ holy prayer rugs and on chairs
and desks in their offices.22 Similarly, an Arab Muslim correctional
officer was allegedly subjected to ongoing remarks, as well as post-
ings of newspaper articles and pictures and graffiti, insulting his
ancestry and national origin at least one hundred times over a one-
year period from 2004 to 2005.23 The plaintiff was repeatedly called
“sand nigga,” “terrorist,” “camel jockey,” “Yasin bin Laden,” and
other derogatory terms.24 Co-workers discussed hog-tying Muslims
in Iraq in front of the plaintiff.25 Earlier this year, on January 3,
2009, a Muslim family of Indian origin was removed from an air-
plane after two teenage passengers interpreted the family’s discus-
sion of plane safety, coupled with their Muslim headscarves and
long beards, as a terrorist plot.26 As recently as September 2009, a
Sikh cab driver was beaten so badly that he suffered a broken
tooth, bruises and stitches to his face as he was called a terrorist
and Taliban.27
The stereotypes underlying such acts of violence and discrimi-
that “because of surrounding work events, a reasonable person would not view such a
statement as a remark directed as a threat against his or her person, but rather a
statement of a political/military opinion.”).
20 Gallup, Muslim West Facts Project, Religious Perceptions in America: With an In-
Depth Analysis of U.S. Attitudes Toward Muslims and Islam 4 (2009), available at http://
www.muslimwestfacts.com/mwf/125315/Religious-Perceptions-America.aspx  (follow
hyperlink to download Adobe’s portable document format).
21 JOHN L. ESPOSITO & DALIA MOGAHED, WHO SPEAKS FOR ISLAM? WHAT A BILLION
MUSLIMS REALLY THINK 155 (2007).
22 No. CIV.A. 4:08-CV-2814, 2009 WL 1406355, at *1 (S.D. Tex. May 15, 2009).
23 Yasin v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 07 C 1266, 2009 WL 1210620, at *4
(N.D. Ill. May 4, 2009) (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment).
24 Id. at 2-5.
25 Id. at 2.
26 Cynthia Dizikes, Muslim Families Removed From AirTran Flight Get Apology, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 3, 2009, at A10.
27 Sunita Sohrabji, Cabdriver Attack May Not Be Hate Crime, Say Police, INDIA WEST,
Sept. 10, 2009, available at http://www.indiawest.com/readmore.aspx?id=1442.
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nation are often perpetuated in the media. The following section
highlights the role of the media and governmental profiling in
sanctioning private acts of discrimination.
II. NEGATIVE MEDIA DEPICTIONS COUPLED WITH GOVERNMENTAL
PROFILING LEGITIMIZES PRIVATE BIAS AGAINST
MUSLIMS, ARABS, AND SOUTH ASIANS
Such blatant bias against an entire religion and ethnic groups
is to a large extent caused by the deluge of images and descriptions
in mainstream media of angry-looking, dark-skinned males with
beards and Arabic names as representing the primary threat to the
safety and national security of Americans.28 Prior to the September
11th terrorist attacks, media depictions of Arabs, Muslims, and peo-
ple from the Middle East were rife with negative and racist stereo-
types of Arab-Americans as the barbarians, the villains, the seducers
of women, and the passive backdrops to European or American
adventures. A post-9/11 review of the United States film industry
evinces the entrenchment of such stereotypes, as Arabs and Mus-
lims are almost exclusively portrayed as terrorists or other negative
characters rather than as everyday people with families and
friends.29 A September 2009 Pew Research poll found that 65% of
non-Muslims regard Islam as very different or somewhat different
from their own religion.30 Because perceived similarity with a relig-
ious group is associated with favorable views of that group, such
28 Cf. Rikabi v. Nicholson, No. 07-60041, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 1305 (5th Cir. Jan.
23, 2008) (for one example of how negative stereotypes of Muslims have permeated
into the workplace, citing defendant’s open reference to Muslims as a threat to the
United States and his dislike of Muslims and how Muslims live).
29 See generally, HELEN HATAB SAMHAN, ARAB AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOUNDATION,
NOTES ON ANTI-ARAB RACISM (1998), http://www.aaiusa.org/page/file/a57733248924
38c0e7_la7bmvqgt.pdf/NotesonAntiArabRacism.pdf. (discussing media typecasting
of Arabs in villain roles); Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and
Immigration Law After Sept. 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 295 (2002) (discussing how a review of U.S. films offers convincing evi-
dence of the vilification of Arabs and Muslims by the movie industry). See JACK
SHAHEEN, REEL BAD ARABS: HOW HOLLYWOOD VILIFIES A PEOPLE 9, 34-35 (2001). See
also AMER-ARAB AFFAIRS COUNCIL, SPLIT VISION: THE PORTRAYALS OF ARABS IN THE
AMERICAN MEDIA (EDMUND GHAREEB ed.,1983), MELANI MCALISTER, EPIC ENCOUNTERS:
CULTURE, MEDIA, AND U.S. INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1945-2000 (2001) (provid-
ing examples of cinema stereotypes); JACK SHAHEEN, THE TV ARAB (1994); James J.
Zogby, Are Arab Americans ‘People Like Us’?, FOREIGN SERVICE J., (2000), available at
http://www.afsa.org/fsj/may00/zogby.cfm (in a study of the portrayal of Arab and
Muslim characters on three major television networks conducted by James Zogby,
President of the Arab American Institute, concluding there were no positive Arab or
Muslim characters to be found.).
30 THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, THE PEW RES. CENTER, VIEWS OF
RELIGIOUS SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES: MUSLIMS WIDELY SEEN AS FACING DISCRIMINA-
40 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:33
perceived differences contribute to negative stereotypes against
Muslims. Consequently, 58% of Americans believe Muslims face
more discrimination in the United States after the September 11th
terrorist attacks. Such harmful racial stereotyping of Arabs and
Muslims in the media and popular culture influences private mis-
conduct and contributes to tangible discrimination in the
workplace.
Concurrently, governmental racial profiling and preventative
law enforcement practices carried out in the form of airport profil-
ing, secret arrests, race-based immigration policies, and selective
enforcement of immigration laws of general applicability legitimize
private biases against Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians.31 In the
first two months after the attacks, more than 1,200 citizens and
noncitizens were detained for interrogation most of whom were
from South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa.32 Since then,
numerous individuals have reported being stopped at gunpoint,
detained for hours, questioned about terrorist connections where
there was no valid suspicion of terrorist activities, and parents have
reported being separated from their small children.33 Meanwhile, a
poll conducted in the fall of 2001 reported that 57% of all Ameri-
cans sanctioned government profiling on the basis of race, gender,
and age in airport searches.34
Governmental racial profiling has continued years after the
September 11th terrorist attacks. In May 2004, the Federal Bureau
of Investigations (“FBI”) launched a campaign wherein it sought to
interview approximately 5,000 Muslim individuals to obtain leads
on suspected terrorist attacks.35 Muslims were questioned at their
TION 1 (2009), http://pewforum.org/newassets/images/reports/summer09/survey
0909.pdf.
31 See Muneer I. Ahmed, A Rage Shared By Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as
Crimes of Passion, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1269 (2004). See also DAVID COLES & JULES
LABEL, LESS FREE, LESS SAFE 102-28 (2007) (providing additional examples of
policies proven ineffective in promoting national security while also reinforcing racial
bias.).
32 Muneer, supra note 31, at 1270.
33 RIGHTS WORKING GROUP, EQUAL TREATMENT DENIED: U. S. IMMIGRATION EN-
FORCEMENT POLICIES, A SHADOW REPORT. TO THE U.N. COMM. ON THE ELIMINATION OF
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 21-23, (2008), http://65.36.162.162/files/RWG_ICERD
ShadowReport_2008.pdf (detailing a number of cases involving harassment and de-
tention of South Asian, Arab, and Muslim travelers at U.S. borders).
34 Press Release, Time/CNN Poll by Harris Interactive, Americans Ready For Mili-
tary Action Against Terrorism (Sept. 18, 2001), available at http://www.harrisinterac-
tive.com/news/allnewsbydate.asp?NewsID=357 (describing TIME/CNN poll inwhich
57% deemed “acceptable” the use of “profiling by age, race and gender to identify
potentially suspicious passengers”).
35 See Susan M. Akram & Maritza Karmely, Immigration and Constitutional Conse-
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workplaces by the FBI,36 which is not only humiliating, but also
subjects the Muslim workers to discriminatory harassment by co-
workers and supervisors. As recent as January 2010, the Transporta-
tion Security Administration issued a policy requiring enhanced
screening for persons from and traveling through thirteen Arab
and Muslim countries and Cuba.37
Moreover, advocacy groups have expressed concerns about
dubious and coercive tactics used to recruit Muslims to serve as
informants.38 Some individuals who refused to become informants
were threatened by or faced retaliation from law enforcement.39
Muslim, Arab, and South Asian travelers reported in 2009 that they
were questioned by Customs and Border Patrol about their faith,
friends and family, and political opinions.40 Effective at the time of
the writing of this article, government policies on the use of race
and ethnicity in law enforcement activity have proven to be inade-
quate and ineffective as they (1) do not cover religious or national
origin profiling; (2) do not apply to state or local law enforcement
agencies; (3) are merely advisory and thus not legally binding; and
(4) contain a broad exception for national security, thereby per-
mitting racial profiling of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians under
the guise of national security.41
quences of Post-9/11 Policies Involving Arabs and Muslims in the United States: Is Alienage a
Distinction without a Difference?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 609, 636 (2004-2005).
36 Id.
37 Mike Ahlers, TSA, Enhanced Screening for People Flying to U.S. from Certain Nations,
CNN, Jan. 3, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/TRAVEL/01/03/tsa.measures/in-
dex.html (listing Sudan, Syria, Iran, Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Nige-
ria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Yemen, and Cuba).
38 See ACLU & THE RIGHTS WORKING GROUP, supra note 10, at 32; see also Gillian
Flaccus, Bail OK’d For Alleged in-Law of Al-Qaida Official, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE,
Feb. 24, 2009, available at http://www3.signonsandiego.com/stories/2009/feb/24/af-
ghan-arrested-022409.
39 ACLU & THE RIGHTS WORKING GROUP, supra note 10, at 33 (documenting spe-
cific cases of retaliation against Muslim individuals who refused to serve as
informants).
40 See id. at 32 (citing Jennifer Turner, ACLU, Blocking Faith, Freezing Charity:
Chilling Muslim Charitable Giving in the “War on Terrorism Financing” (2009)); see
also ASIAN LAW CAUCUS STAFF & STANFORD LAW SCHOOL IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CLINIC,
RETURNING HOME: HOW U.S. GOVERNMENT PRACTICES UNDERMINE CIVIL RIGHTS AT
OUR NATION’S DOORSTEP (2009), http://www.asianlawcaucus.org/wp-content/
uploads/2009/04/Returning%20Home.pdf.
41 See ASIAN LAW CAUCUS STAFF & STANFORD LAW SCHOOL IMMIGRANT RIGHTS
CLINIC, supra note 40, at 14. Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, GUI-
DANCE REGARDING THE USE OF RACE BY FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (June,
2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/guidance_on_race.php; U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY’S COMMIT-
MENT TO RACE NEUTRALITY IN LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES (June 1, 2004), http://
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CRCL_MemoCommitmentRaceNeutrality_June04.pdf.
42 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:33
Immigration policies, in particular, have been used to target
particular groups perceived to be a threat to national security,
thereby reinforcing negative stereotypes and public bias against
these groups.42 The United States government adopted the Na-
tional Security Entry-Exit Registration System (“NSEERS”) that un-
til the present day requires immigrants from primarily Middle
Eastern and North African countries to participate in a special re-
gistration program.43 To declare victory in its purported “war on
terror,” the government systematically miscategorized detentions
and deportations of detainees guilty of minor immigration viola-
tions as terrorism cases.44 The government’s counter-terrorism
practices and policies have thus institutionalized a policy of dis-
crimination against immigrants perceived to be Muslim, Arab, Mid-
dle Eastern, or South Asian on the basis of their name, race,
religion, ethnicity, or national origin.45 The government’s deliber-
ate use of racial and nationality-based distinctions following the
September 11th terrorist attacks has contributed to a climate in
which employment discrimination against Arabs, South Asians, and
Muslims in America is condoned.46
Not only are the racial slurs and epithets addressed herein in-
42 See, e.g., Letter from Kareem W. Shora, National Executive Director, American-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, to Timothy J. Keefer, Acting Officer, U.S. De-
partment of Homeland Security (February 26, 2009), available at http://www.adc.org/
PDF/frontlinecomplaint.pdf.
43 ACLU & THE RIGHTS WORKING GROUP, supra note 10, at 29.
44 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE DEPART OF JUSTICE’S INTERNAL CONTROLS
OVER TERRORISM REPORTING (2007), www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/plus/a0720/final.
pdf; see Dan Eggen, Justice Dept. Statistics on Terrorism Faulted, WASH. POST, Feb. 21,
2007, at A8.
45 See, e.g., the New York City Police Department’s report on jihadi radicalization
where it states: The subtle and non-criminal nature of the behaviors involved in the
process of radicalization makes it difficult to identify or even monitor from a law
enforcement standpoint. Taken in isolation, individual behaviors can be seen as in-
nocuous; however, when seen as part of the continuum of the radicalization process,
their significance becomes more important. Considering the sequencing of these be-
haviors and the need to identify those entering this process at the earliest possible
stage makes intelligence the critical tool in helping to thwart an attack or even pre-
vent the planning of future plots. MITCHELL D. SILBER AND ARVIN BHATT, NEW YORK
POLICE DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, RADICALIZATION IN THE WEST: THE HOME-
GROWN THREAT 10 (2007), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/pub-
lic_information/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf. Such language
unambiguously supports surveillance and profiling of practicing Muslims who adopt
an orthodox interpretation of Islam that is oft generalized as “jihadist,” with no dis-
tinction between a conservative interpretation of orthodox Islam and a more extreme
interpretation wherein unlawful violence is encouraged.
46 See Bill Ong Hing, Vigilante Racism: The De-Americanization of Immigrant America, 7
MICH. J. RACE & L. 441, 449-50 (2002) (proffering that official acts of de-Americaniza-
tion profiling condone private vigilante action against non-European Americans).
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herently offensive, but they often reflect a profound ignorance of
the differences between the Arab and South Asian race, the Sikh
and Muslim religions, and the diversity of national origins of those
who adhere to the Islamic faith. Part III is a humble attempt to
provide some context to the racial, religious, and national origins
definitions cited in this paper. Due to the complexity of the issues
at hand, it is highly recommended that readers, and especially em-
ployment law practitioners, conduct in depth research on the cul-
tures, heritage, and religious practices at issue.
III. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ARAB, MUSLIM, MIDDLE EASTERN,
SIKH AND SOUTH ASIAN COMMUNITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Arab Americans and Middle Easterners
“Arab” is a cultural and linguistic term used to refer to persons
who speak Arabic as their first language.47 The “Arab World” con-
sists of countries which include Lebanon, Iraq, Morocco, Palestine,
Jordan, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.48
Notably, persons from Iran and Turkey are not Arabs and identify
themselves as Persians and Turks, respectively.49 Individuals who
identify themselves as Arabs often also identify themselves as hav-
ing a specific national origin that is not in conflict with being Arab.
For example, a person whose family originates from Jordan may
identify herself as both an Arab and Jordanian American.
The term “Middle Easterner” is used to describe persons
whose national or ethnic origin derives from a country in North
Africa or the Middle East, including Iran and Turkey.50 Persons
originating from Afghanistan are often mistakenly categorized as
Middle Easterner or Arab, although Dari, a dialect of Farsi, is the
national language.51 Individuals that properly qualify as Middle
Easterners do not normally identify themselves as Middle Eas-
terners, but rather as Arab, Persian, Iranian, or Turkish juxtaposed
47 THE AMERICAN-ARAB ANTIDISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE, Facts About Arabs and the
Arab World, http://www.adc.org/index.php?id=248 (last visited Nov. 17, 2009).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. (defining Middle East as territory that includes the Arab countries from
Egypt east to the Persian Gulf, plus Israel and Iran. Turkey is sometimes considered
part of Europe as well).
51 Afghanistan Online, Languages Spoken in Afghanistan, http://www.afghan-
web.com/language (last visited Nov. 17, 2009).
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with American (i.e. Arab American or Egyptian American, Persian
or Iranian American, or Turkish American).
The Supreme Court in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji held
that Arab descent qualifies as a “race” under The Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq. (1991).52 However, the U.S. Census Bureau
classifies persons originating from Europe, the Middle East, and
North Africa as “White,” which has proven to be an obstacle to
tracking discrimination against Arabs and Middle Easterners.53 As a
result, the EEOC adopted a new mechanism, entitled “Code Z” to
monitor and track the filing of “backlash” cases comprising charges
brought by individuals who are or are perceived to be Muslim,
Arab, Middle Eastern, or South Asian.54
Arab immigrants began arriving in sizable numbers during the
1880s and approximately 3.5 million Americans trace their roots to
an Arab country.55 The majority of Arab Americans are native-
born.56 More than 80% percent of Arab Americans are U.S. citi-
zens.57 Arab Americans are employed in all major occupation
groups; however 72% work in managerial, professional, technical,
sales, or administrative jobs.58 Eighty-five percent of Arab Ameri-
cans have a high school diploma, more than 40% have a bachelor’s
degree or higher, and 17% have post-graduate degrees.59 The met-
ropolitan areas with the largest concentration of Arab Americans
are Los Angeles, Detroit, New York City, northeastern New Jersey,
Chicago, and the Washington, D.C. metro area.60 Contrary to pub-
lic perceptions and media portrayals, the majority of Arab Ameri-
cans are Christian, a group comprised of Roman/Eastern
52 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987).
53 See Helen Hatab Samhan, Not Quite White: Race Classification and the Arab Ameri-
can Experience, in ARABS IN AMERICA: BUILDING A NEW FUTURE 209 (Michael W. Sulei-
man ed., Temple Univ. Press 1999) (providing a useful historical analysis of how
immigration law impacted the categorization of persons from the Middle East and
North Africa as whites by the U.S. Census Bureau).
54 Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Provides Answers about Workplace Rights of Muslims,
Arabs, South Asians and Sikhs (May 15, 2002), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/
5-15-02.html; see also S. Mitra Kalita, Job Fair Caters to Muslim Immigrants; Years after 9/11
Attacks, Bias is Still Perceived, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2005, at D12.
55 ARAB AMERICAN INSTITUTE, QUICK FACTS ABOUT ARAB AMERICANS, available at
http://www.aaiusa.org/page/file/8e66571fbe9d44abed_bsomvyjkp.pdf/quickfacts.
pdf.
56 Samhan, supra note 53.
57 ARAB AMERICAN INSTITUTE, supra note 55.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 ARAB AMERICAN INSTITUTE, ARAB AMERICAN POPULATION HIGHLIGHTS, http://
www.aaiusa.org/page/file/9298c231f3a79e30c6_g7m6bx9hs.pdf/population_high
lights.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2010).
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Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, or Protestants.61 Approximately 24%
of Arab Americans are Muslims.
B. Muslims
The world’s 1.3 billion Muslims come from diverse nationali-
ties, ethnic and tribal groups and cultures, speak many languages,
and practice distinct customs. The majority of the world’s Muslims
live in Asia and Africa, with the largest Muslim communities in In-
donesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, and Nigeria.62 Eighty-five per-
cent of Muslims worldwide are Sunni. The other 15% are Shia and
reside predominantly in Iran, Iraq, and Bahrain.63 The five tenets
of Islam are the confession of faith, the pilgrimage to Mecca, chari-
table giving, prayer five times a day, and fasting for one month
each year from sunrise to sunset.64 The religious requirement of
daily prayer and fasting cause many Muslim employees to seek re-
ligious accommodation in the workplace.65
In the United States, Islam is the fourth largest religion.66 It is
estimated that two to six million Muslims live in America and origi-
nate from countries all over the world.67 The ethnic origins of the
61 ARAB AMERICAN INSTITUTE, RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF ARAB AMERICANS (2002),
http://www.aaiusa.org/page/file/b8bad613905570ea97_mghwmvb2d.pdf/ancestry.
pdf (showing that 35% of Arab Americans are Roman/Eastern Catholic, 18% are
Eastern Orthodox which includes Antiochian, Syrian, Greek, and Coptic rites; 10%
are Protestant, and 13% have no religious affiliation).
62 JOHN L. ESPOSITO & DALIA MOGAHED, WHO SPEAKS FOR ISLAM? WHAT A BILLION
MUSLIMS REALLY THINK 2 (2007).
63 Id.
64 See generally id. at 7-16.
65 The noon and afternoon daily prayers occur during regular business hours and
each prayer requires approximately 15 minutes to complete, preferably in a quiet area
such as a private office or empty conference room. On the years when the month of
Ramadan occurs in the winter, breaking fast may occur during regular business hours.
Accordingly, employees who are fasting require a break from work to eat their first
meal of the day. Furthermore, Muslims in some Muslim countries close their busi-
nesses, employees in offices adjourn to a prayer room, and professionals and laborers
simply stop what they are doing and pray. Id. at 12.
66 THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SUR-
VEY, RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION: DIVERSE AND DYNAMIC 10 (2008), http://religions.pewfo-
rum.org/pdf/report2-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf.
67 See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MUSLIM AMERICANS: MIDDLE CLASS AND MOSTLY MAIN-
STREAM 13 (May 22, 2007), http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf
(estimating 2.35 million Muslims in the United States); IHSAN BAGBY ET AL., COUNCIL
ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS, THE MOSQUE IN AMERICA: A NATIONAL PORTRAIT 3
(2001) (estimating 6-7 million Muslims in America is a reasonable figure in light of
the study); see also COUNCIL ON ISLAMIC EDUCATION, TEACHING ABOUT ISLAM AND MUS-
LIMS IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSROOM 2 (1995), http://aai.3cdn.net/ceeecfb6bf1ff4
950a_fjm6bebci.pdf. (stating that over 1.2 billion people throughout the world are
adherents to Islam).
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Muslim population in America are as follow: 42% are African
American, 24.4% are South Asian, 12.4% are Arab, 5.2% are Afri-
can, 3.6% are Iranian, 2.4% are Turkish, 2% are Southeast Asian,
1.6% are Caucasian, and 5.6% are undetermined.68 Approximately
65% of Muslims in America are foreign-born and 61% of foreign-
born Muslims immigrated to the United States in the 1990s or
later, thereby making them a relatively new immigrant commu-
nity.69 Muslim Americans are younger than the non-Muslim popu-
lation with 56% of adult Muslims between the ages of 18 and 39 in
comparison to 40% in the general public.70 Approximately one
quarter of Muslim Americans have a college degree, including 10%
who have completed graduate study, which mirrors the United
States general public.71 Similarly, family income among Muslim
Americans is comparable with that of the United States’ population
as a whole, with 41% of Muslim households earning $50,000 or
more annually, compared to 44% of the general public.72
A 2007 study of Muslim Americans reported that 53% of Mus-
lim Americans have found it more difficult to be a Muslim in the
United States since the September 11th terrorist attacks.73 Twenty-
five percent of Muslim Americans say they have been the victim of
discrimination in the United States. Within the 25% far more na-
tive-born Muslims than Muslim immigrants say they have been a
victim of discrimination.74
C. South Asians and Sikhs
South Asians include persons from Pakistan, Bangladesh, In-
dia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and the Maldives.75 The majority of South
Asian Muslims are from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Maldives.
The percentage of the Muslim population in these nations is as
follows: 97% in Pakistan, 88.3% in Bangladesh, 100% in the
68 COUNCIL ON ISLAMIC EDUCATION, TEACHING ABOUT ISLAM AND MUSLIMS IN THE
PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSROOM 5 (1995), http://aai.3cdn.net/ceeecfb6bf1ff4950a_fjm6b
ebci.pdf.
69 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MUSLIM AMERICANS: MIDDLE CLASS AND MOSTLY MAIN-
STREAM 15 (2007), http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf.
70 Id. at 18.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 2.
74 Id. at 4.
75 See generally THE WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT: YEAR IN RE-
VIEW (2008), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTANNREP2K8/Resources/YR07
_CH2_RP04_SAR.pdf.
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Maldives, 12.4% in India, 7% in Sri Lanka, and 4% in Nepal.76 Al-
though there are a number of different ethnic groups and numer-
ous dialects spoken in South Asia, persons unfamiliar with the
region may not easily be able to identify whether a person is of
Pakistani origin, Indian origin, a Muslim, a Hindu, or a Sikh. Ubiq-
uitous images in the media of dark skinned men with foreign
sounding names, donning beards and turbans portrayed as the
“typical” terrorist, caused many South Asians, including those that
are not Muslim, to be caught in the dragnet of post-9/11 discrimi-
nation, notwithstanding that such a notion is erroneous.
Sikh men wearing turbans that look similar to the turbans
worn by Osama bin Laden and the Taliban make Sikhs a visible
minority group, and in the wake of the September 11th terrorist
attacks, an accessible proxy for Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda, and
the Taliban.77 This occurred despite the separate doctrinal views,
different geographical homeland, different native languages, and
distinct turban styles of Sikhs from those suspected of committing
the terrorist attacks. As a result, Sikhs have suffered verbal harass-
ment and have been denounced as terrorists, “bin Laden,”
“raghead,” or “towelhead.” They have been subjected to detention
by law enforcement, racial violence, denial of entry into public
spaces, airport profiling, and employment discrimination.78 As xen-
ophobia has increased against Muslims, Arabs, and persons per-
ceived as such, the conspicuous Muslim veil and Sikh turban are
perceived as marks of separation and proof of a refusal to assimi-
late into mainstream society.79
Sikhism originated in the Punjab, a region that is now split
between present-day northwest India and Eastern Pakistan; how-
ever, most Sikh Americans are of Indian national origin.80 Sikhs
are not permitted to cut their hair, and male Sikhs are mandated
by their faith to wear turbans, which they consider to be an out-
76 U.S. Dep’t of State, http://www.state.gov/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2009) (clicking
on the “country” link allows the selection of a particular country, next click on the
link indicating the country that was selected, finally click on “background notes” to
view the country’s Muslim population).
77 See generally Neha Singh Gohil & Dawinder S. Sidhu, The Sikh Turban: Post-9/11
Challenges to this Article of Faith, 9.2 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 1 (2008).
78 See Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Flying While Brown: Federal Civil Rights Remedies to
Post-9/11 Airline Racial Profiling of South Asians, 10 ASIAN L. J. 215, 216 n.5, 248-52
(2003).
79 D.C., MD., & VA. ADVISORY COMMITTEES TO THE U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
CIVIL RIGHTS, CONCERNS IN THE METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON, D.C., AREA IN THE AFTER-
MATH OF THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 TRAGEDIES (2003).
80 See generally Gohil & Sidhu, supra note 77, at 1, 40-42.
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ward manifestation of their devotion to God and adherence to
strictures of their religion.81 Although Sikh women can wear tur-
bans, most choose not to and instead may wear a thin chiffon
scarf.82 Sikh boys start wearing turbans in their teenage years and
until then, they wear a smaller under-turban similar to a large ban-
dana wrapped around the boy’s hair.83 The Sikh religion mandates
all of its members to keep five articles of faith: unshorn hair, a
small comb to keep the hair neat, a steel bracelet, a ceremonial
dagger or sword, and long underwear.84
The experiences of discrimination by Sikhs have mirrored
those of Arabs and Muslims, evincing the American public’s confla-
tion of terrorism with anyone who is or perceived to be Muslim,
Arab, Afghan, Middle Eastern, or South Asian on the basis of their
name, race, religion, ethnicity, or national origin.
IV. ETHNIC ORIGIN AND NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION
UNDER TITLE VII
Title VII prohibits harassment on the basis of ethnic or na-
tional origin.85 Such harassment is manifested when an employer
fails to maintain a workplace free of unlawful discrimination. De-
nial of equal employment opportunity constitutes national origin
discrimination when it is based on an individual’s physical, cul-
tural, or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group, or be-
cause of the individual’s ancestral origin.86 The Supreme Court
defined “national origin” as “the country where a person was born,
or, more broadly, the country from which his or her ancestors
came.”87 In contrast, discrimination on the basis of citizenship does
not qualify as national origin discrimination.88
Title VII national origin discrimination claims may be based
on theories alleging disparate treatment, disparate impact, or hos-
tile work environment. National origin discrimination suits may be
brought by individuals of any national origin who believe they have
been victims of discrimination.89 Title VII also protects those who
81 Id.
82 Id. at 15.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 12.
85 Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 513 (6th Cir. 1999).
86 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (2009).
87 Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973).
88 See id. at 95.
89 See, e.g., Mohr v. Dustrol, Inc., 306 F.3d 636 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that “His-
panic supervisor’s alleged derogatory comments about the workplace capabilities of
women and non-Hispanics were ‘direct evidence’ of discrimination, for purposes of
2009] STICKS AND STONES, THE WORDS THAT HURT 49
encounter discrimination based on association with individuals of a
protected class.90 The EEOC enumerates the following types of as-
sociation with a protected class on which a claim of national origin
discrimination may be based: “(a) marriage to or association with
persons of a national origin group; (b) membership in, or associa-
tion with an organization identified with or seeking to promote the
interests of national origin groups; (c) attendance or participation
in schools, churches, temples or mosques, generally used by per-
sons of a national origin group; (d) because an individual’s name
or spouse’s name is associated with a national origin group.”91
One of the most common claims raised in national origin
charges, which are filed with the EEOC, is harassment.92 Harass-
ment based on national origin “can take many forms, including
ethnic slurs, workplace graffiti, or other offensive conduct directed
towards an individual’s birthplace, ethnicity, culture, or foreign ac-
cent.”93 Ethnic origin is based on commonly recognized ethnic dis-
tinctions, thereby including persons that may not be related to a
particular country or region.94
The EEOC issued regulations specifically dealing with sexual
and national origin harassment.95 The EEOC’s sexual harassment
guidelines apply equally to racial and ethnic or national origin dis-
crimination.96 Correspondingly, courts have demonstrated agree-
ment in applying a uniform approach in evaluating hostile work
environment claims regardless whether they are based on national
origin, ethnic origin, race, or sex.97 Plaintiffs must show pervasive
summary judgment motion on white female employee’s Title VII claims alleging that
employer failed to rehire her based on her gender, race, and national origin”), abro-
gated by Dessert Place, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
90 See, e.g., Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 574 (6th Cir. 2000) (hold-
ing that plaintiff, a terminated university vice president who advocated on behalf of
minorities and women, did not need to be a member of a protected class to state a
claim under Title VII but only needed to allege that he was discriminated against on
the basis of his association of a protected class).
91 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (2009).
92 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 13-IV (2002).
93 Id.
94 See, e.g., Janko v. Ill. State Toll Highway Auth., 704 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
(holding that a Gypsy may be entitled to protection against national origin discrimi-
nation by virtue of being a member of an ethnic group not originally in the United
States and different from the majority).
95 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2009); 29 C.F.R. § 1606.8 (2009).
96 § 1604.11(a), 198 n.1.
97 See Crawford v. Medina General Hosp., 96 F.3d 830, 834 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating
that the elements and burden of proof for “hostile environment” are the same regard-
less of the discrimination context in which the claim is brought).
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or severe harassment, an employer’s responsibility for harassment
of coworkers, and an employer’s failure to take corrective action in
response to complaints of harassment.98
V. THEORIES OF LIABILITY FOR HOSTILE
WORK ENVIRONMENT CLAIMS
Much of the post-9/11 discrimination that manifested itself in
hostile work environments is expressed through racial slurs, ethnic
epithets, and other forms of verbal abuse. The U.S. Supreme Court
held that “when a workplace is permeated with discriminatory in-
timidation, ridicule, and insults that is sufficiently severe or perva-
sive as to alter conditions of the victim’s employment and create an
abusive working environment, Title VII is violated.”99 In determin-
ing whether harassment is sufficiently severe to create a hostile
work environment, the employer’s conduct as a whole is evaluated
in the context of all the relevant circumstances.100 In a race-based,
religion-based, or national-origin-based hostile work environment,
courts have required the plaintiff to demonstrate that: 1) the plain-
tiff is a member of a protected class; 2) the plaintiff was subjected
to verbal or physical conduct based on racial, religious, or ethnic
origin; 3) the conduct was unwelcome; 4) the conduct was suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment
and create an abusive working environment; and 5) the existence
of employer liability.101 A plaintiff may establish a cause of action
under Title VII notwithstanding the defendant’s mistaken belief
that the plaintiff’s ethnic characteristics are those of a protected
class; therefore, plaintiffs do not lose the protection of discrimina-
tion laws because they are discriminated against for the wrong
reasons.102
98 See Newman v. Federal Exp. Corp., 266 F.3d 401, 405 (6th Cir. 2001).
99 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1989) (quoting Har-
ris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
100 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23, 73 (1993) (stating “[t]he real social
impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding cir-
cumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple
recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed.”).
101 Newman, 266 F.3d at 405; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787
(1998) (demonstrating the application of Title VII’s hostile environment).
102 See, e.g., Estate of Amos v. City of Page, 257 F.3d 1086, 1094 (9th Cir. 2001)
(white plaintiff mistakenly believed to be a member of a protected class); see LaRocca
v. Precision Motorcars, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 762, 770 (D. Neb. 1999) (saying terms that
would be derogatory to a Mexican person against an Italian plaintiff); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1606.1 (2009) (illustrating that national origin discrimination includes acts under-
taken “because an individual has the physical, cultural, or linguistic characteristics of
a national origin group.”).
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The objectionable environment must be both objectively and
subjectively offensive such that a reasonable person would find it
hostile or abusive, and the victim in fact perceives the environment
as such.103 In determining whether a hostile work environment ex-
ists, courts look at all the circumstances, including the frequency of
the discriminatory conduct, the severity of the discriminatory con-
duct, whether the conduct was threatening, whether the conduct
was physically humiliating or a mere utterance, and whether the
conduct unreasonably interfered with an employee’s work per-
formance.104 Courts assess the cumulative quantity, frequency, and
severity of those slurs to obtain a realistic view of the work environ-
ment. The level of severity or seriousness required to give rise to a
claim under Title VII varies inversely with the pervasiveness or fre-
quency of the objectionable conduct.105 Moreover, the derogatory
comments do not have to be made in the presence of the employee
in order to render the comments relevant to a Title VII hostile
work environment claim.106 In determining employer liability, the
employee must show that the employer knew or should have
known of the harassment and failed to take prompt reasonable ac-
tion against the harassing employee.107
Hostile work environment claims are generally difficult for
plaintiffs to win because courts accept the premise that Title VII is
not a “general civility code,” and thus only egregious conduct is
found to alter the conditions of employment.108 Conduct that is
deplorable, off-color, or offensive to our most basic values of ac-
cording respect and dignity to every person is not always
actionable.
While ethnic jokes and derogatory remarks are a common ba-
sis for national origin harassment claims, derogatory remarks alone
may not be sufficient proof in the absence of any ethnic content to
the remarks. Where discriminatory conduct consists solely of de-
103 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787.
104 Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
105 Elison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991).
106 Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1997); Rodgers v. Western-
Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1993) (indicating no single act can more
quickly “alter the condition of employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment,” than the use of an unambiguously racial epithet such as “nigger” by a supervi-
sor in the presence of his or her subordinates).
107 Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir. 1982); Steele v. Offshore
Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 1989), reh’g denied, 874 F.2d 821
(11th Cir. 1989) (discussing corporate liability).
108 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998); see also
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788; BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASS-
MENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 175 (1992).
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rogatory comments that are “sporadic or part of casual conversa-
tion,” courts decline to find that an employee suffered severe or
pervasive discrimination.109 For example, in Kahn v. Pepsi Cola Bot-
tling Group, the Court found that a single incident in which a super-
visor called an Indian plaintiff an obscene name was unrelated to
the plaintiff’s national origin and thus did not support a claim of
discrimination based on national origin.110 Similarly, in Torres v.
County of Oakland, the Court held that a supervisor’s reference to
the plaintiff as an “ass” or “asshole” in a single incident could not
support a national origin harassment charge because those terms
are not racially or ethnically charged and the single incident was
not sufficiently pervasive to create an abusive working environ-
ment.111 The use of an ethnic or racial epithet that engenders of-
fensive feelings in an employee may be insufficient to create a
hostile work environment.112 Likewise, “racial slurs allegedly spo-
ken by co-workers ha[ve] to be so ‘commonplace, overt and deni-
grating that they create[ ] an atmosphere charged with racial
hostility.’”113
Evidence of derogatory remarks based on membership in a
protected class combined with pranks and other harassing behav-
ior may constitute harassment based on national origin.114 In a
case where a Hispanic plaintiff was subjected to frequent deroga-
tory comments about Hispanics and rude behavior, the Eighth Cir-
cuit held that not all instances of harassment need be overt
discrimination to be relevant to a Title VII claim if they are part of
a course of conduct which is tied to evidence of discriminatory ani-
mus.115 Thus, the behavior should be analyzed in its entirety to as-
sess the degree of harassment and, while infrequent rude behavior
109 Al-Salem v. Bucks County Water & Sewer Auth., No. 97-6843, 1999 WL 167729,
at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 1999) (quoting McCray v. DPC Industries, Inc., 942 F. Supp.
288 (E.D. Tex. 1996)).
110 547 F. Supp. 736, 739 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
111 758 F.2d 147, 152 (6th Cir. 1985).
112 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 406
U.S. 957 (1972)); Elmahdi v. Mariott Hotel Serv. Inc., 339 F.3d 645, 653 (8th Cir.
2003).
113 Edwards v. Wallace Cmty. Coll., 49 F.3d 1517, 1521 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting
EEOC v. Beverage Canners, Inc., 897 F.2d 1067, 1068 (11th Cir. 1990)).
114 Lagunovich v. Findlay City School Sys., 181 F. Supp. 2d 753, 766 (N.D. Oh.
2001) (analogizing a national origin discrimination claim with a sexual harassment
claim in Williams v. General Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 533 (6th Cir. 1999) and stating
that “plaintiff only has to show that but for their national origin, they would not have
been harassed.”).
115 Diaz v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 318 F.3d 796, 799-800 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Carter v.
Chrysler Corp., 173 F.3d 693, 701 (8th Cir. 1999)).
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does not create a hostile work environment, the cumulative effect
of such behavior might support the claim.116 Adopting this reason-
ing, the Seventh Circuit in Cerros v. Steel Technologies Inc. stated
“[w]hile there is no ‘magic number’ of slurs that indicate a hostile
work environment, we have recognized before that an unambigu-
ously racial epithet falls on the ‘more severe’ end of the
spectrum.”117
Consequently, employers often argue that the alleged conduct
is a form of “simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated inci-
dents” that are not actionable.118 Moreover, when an employer em-
ploys others of the same national origin as the plaintiff, ethnic
remarks made during a casual conversation may be used to show a
lack of intent necessary to establish national origin discrimina-
tion.119 A showing of the ethnic diversity of the employer’s work
force has also been considered as proof that ethnic remarks were
not motivated by national origin bias.120
A. Stereotypes Conflating Arabs and Muslims with Terrorism Shape
Harassment in the Workplace
Claims filed in connection with post-9/11 discrimination al-
lege discrimination on account of race, national origin, and relig-
ion. Because hostile work environment claims often involve the
verbalization of stereotypes and prejudices, such claims offer valua-
ble insight into the extent to which the September 11th terrorist
attacks has aggravated public bias against Muslims, Arabs, and
South Asians. The passage of the USA PATRIOT Act further aggra-
vated such discrimination by requiring employers to investigate
their employees.121 Consequently, harassment in the workplace has
116 Id. at 800 (consisting of rude noises, laughter, and statements calling plaintiff
“stupid,” such as “Hispanics are stupid” and “Hispanics should scavenge for beans on
the floor.”).
117 Cerros v. Steel Tech., Inc., 288 F.3d 1040, 1047 (7th Cir. 2002).
118 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-88 (1998) (citing Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1999) and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.,
523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998)). See, e.g., Kosereis v. Rhode Island, 331 F.3d 207, 209-10, 216
(1st Cir. 2003) (illustrating that Turkish-born Muslim employed as a vocational school
instructor claimed residents of school called him “turkey,” and teased him about the
food he brought for lunch; name-calling and teasing failed to rise to the level of
severe or pervasive conduct); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e—2000e-17 (2009).
119 See Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1977).
120 See Fekete v. U.S. Steel Corp., 353 F. Supp. 1177, 1186 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
121 Martin Carrigan, Theodore Alex & Chris Ward, The U.S. Patriot Act Deconstruc-
tion, Civil Liberties and Patriotism, 6 J. BUS. & ECON. RES. 3, 25 (2008) (illustrating the
effect of the U.S. PATRIOT Act on businesses and their employees). See also Maryann
James & Christopher Latham, Security Issues at Work; Applicants Face More Scrutiny,
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become an act of patriotism for those Americans that associate in-
dividuals perceived as Arabs or Muslims with terrorists.122
A review of employment discrimination cases involving plain-
tiffs from these communities shows how negative media depictions
and targeted government policies, which predated September 11
and were amplified post-9/11, shaped Americans’ views of individ-
uals having any connection with Islam and/or the Middle East.
Many, if not all, of the ethnic slurs and epithets directed at the
employees have some connection to the stereotyping terminology
used in the media in connection with the September 11th terrorist
attacks and the indefinite “War on Terror.”123
As the cases show, the stereotypical portrayals of terrorism
shaped by the media have permeated the workplace.124 These cases
also show the courts’ general unwillingness to recognize the injuri-
ous impact such negative stereotypes have on Muslim, Arab, and
South Asian workers.
1. National Origin or Ethnic Origin Harassment Are Often
Dismissed on Summary Judgment Because Courts
Fail to Recognize Severity of Post-9/11 Ethnic
Slurs
Plaintiffs from Muslim, Arab, and South Asian communities
face the same challenges in surviving summary judgment as do
other plaintiffs alleging hostile work environment claims. However,
the factual allegations in the cases below highlight two key points:
1) negative stereotypes conflating Muslims, Arabs, and South
Asians with terrorism have become more entrenched with time and
permeate the workplace; and 2) absent an immediate physical
threat to their safety, plaintiffs facing discrimination in the form of
ethnic slurs and epithets may find little relief through the courts.
Attorneys, therefore, should provide adequate historical and cul-
NEWSDAY, Aug. 6, 2004, at A52 (describing employers’ increased scrutiny of
employees).
122 See Ass’n of Trial Lawyers of America, The Post 9/11 Backlash: American Treatment
of a Vulnerable Minority in the Workplace, 2 ATLA ANNUAL CONVENTION REFERENCE
MATERIALS 1807 (2004).
123 See David A. Bosworth, American Crusade: The Religious Roots of the War on Terror, 7
BARRY L. REV. 65 (2006) (arguing that the rhetoric of “War on Terror” attracts Ameri-
cans from all views, from the religious to the liberal, by obscuring the underlying
political choices and simplifying the war to one of good against evil, and that people
know little about the religion apart from what is disseminated through the media).
124 See Liaquat Ali Khan, The Essential Terrorist, 45 WASHBURN L. J. 47, 48 (2005)
(describing in detail the highly influential negative images of Muslims as produced
and published in media and literature).
2009] STICKS AND STONES, THE WORDS THAT HURT 55
tural context to persuade the courts to analyze the discrimination
through the post-9/11 context.
The following cases exemplify the failure of the courts to ap-
preciate the hostility and prejudice associated with accusations of
terrorism, disloyalty to the nation, and backwardness of Arab or
Middle Eastern individuals.
In Uddin v. Universal Avionics Systems Corp., a co-worker looked
at the plaintiff on September 11, 2001 and stated “I am going to
buy a gun” at least three times that day.125 During the war in Af-
ghanistan that same year, a co-worker stated “What’s going on with
your cousin in Afghanistan” notwithstanding that the plaintiff was
of Indian descent.126 When the plaintiff’s watch alarm went off, a
co-worker jumped and commented she thought it was a “bomb
alarm.”127 Despite the offensiveness of these comments, the court
dismissed the plaintiff’s claims on summary judgment because the
court found the comments were infrequent and not sufficiently of-
fensive in comparison to other cases where the offensive comments
were made 18 times in two and a half weeks and 15 times in a four
month period.128 Rather than focusing on the hostility of the de-
rogatory remarks and prejudice espoused against the Afghan na-
tional origin, the court misguidedly limited its analysis to a
comparison of the volume of the remarks with an atypical case in-
volving an unusually high volume of slurs.
In Delfani v. U.S. Capitol Guide Board, an Iranian and Muslim
female employee faced continuous insults and derogatory state-
ments about Muslims and individuals of Middle Eastern descent.129
The plaintiff’s supervisor made racist comments and jokes during
the span of a year after the September 11th terrorist attacks.130 He
chastised the plaintiff more than once as being “heartless” for fail-
ing to call him and her co-workers to apologize for the tragic
events of September 11, 2001.131 Although the court dismissed the
125 Uddin v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., No. CIV.A.1:05-1115(TWT), 2006 WL
1835291, at *1 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 2006).
126 Id.
127 Id. at *2.
128 Id. at *4-5 (comparing Hulsey v. Pride Rest., L.L.C., 367 F.3d 1238, 1248 (11th
Cir. 2004) which involved indirect propositions for sex, following plaintiff to the rest-
room, attempting to touch plaintiff’s breasts, and placing hands down plaintiff’s pants
and Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad. Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d 501, 509 (11th Cir.
2000)).
129 No. 03-0949(RWR), 2005 WL 736644, at *1 (D. D.C. Mar. 31, 2005).
130 Id.
131 Id.
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plaintiff’s claims on procedural grounds132 and thus did not ad-
dress the merits of her case, the facts alleged in this case further
corroborate how the September 11th terrorist attacks have shaped
anti-Muslim and anti-Middle Eastern prejudices in the workplace.
In Hussein v. Highgate Hotels, Inc., a co-worker told a Pakistani
Muslim that he “did not understand why the United States did not
just drop an atomic bomb on Afghanistan.”133 The plaintiff was
called “Taliban” on a nearly daily basis and told that he should
dress like Osama bin Laden for Halloween.134 The court’s dismissal
of the plaintiff’s claims on summary judgment because of “sur-
rounding world events” meant that “a reasonable person would not
view such a statement as a remark directed as a threat against his or
her person, but rather a statement of a political/military opin-
ion.”135 The court here mischaracterizes what is clearly national or-
igin bias as actionable political opinion. Misconstruing ethnic slurs
as mere political opinion and as justified by current events under-
mines the remedial objectives of Title VII and, in effect, provides
an exception to national origin and racial discrimination when the
derogatory remarks touch upon U.S. foreign policy and military
operations. Just as discrimination against persons of Vietnamese or-
igin was not justified, much less legal, during the Vietnamese war,
discrimination against Iraqis, Afghans, and other Middle Eas-
terners during the indefinite “War on Terror,” focused on prima-
rily Middle Eastern nations, not be tolerated by the courts.
In Sabra v. Shafer, a Muslim Arab of Egyptian nationality was
asked if he “supported Al-Qaeda,” called “Sadam” [sic], and told
that “immigration is looking for you” in front of his coworkers.136
While co-workers were watching a television report on an attempt
to shoot the New York City Mayor, a supervisor said, “Sabra here?”
implying that he should be considered a suspect due to his Arab
origin. The Court deemed the comments merely inappropriate
132 Id. at *6.
133 No. #03-2373, #2005 WL 627964, at *268 (6th Cir. Mar. 18, 2005).
134 Id. But see Jeanne Meserve & Mike M. Ahlers, DHS Employee Put on Leave After
Wearing “Offensive” Costume, CNN, Nov. 6, 2007, available at http://www.cnn.com/
2007/US/11/06/ice.costume/ (reporting DHS’ decision to suspend employee, who
wore striped prison outfit, dreadlocks, and darkened skin make-up to a Halloween
fundraiser party, and to conduct an inquiry, after other employees’ complaints of
offensiveness).
135 Delfani v. U.S. Capitol Guide Bd., No. 03-0949(RWR), 2005 WL 736644, at *268-
70 (D. D.C. Mar. 31, 2005) (affirming the District Court’s granting of summary judg-
ment because plaintiff complained to the harasser but not to the harasser’s supervisor
or human resources and thus failed to establish respondeat superior liability).
136 No. 04 Civ. 2759 (LTS) (KNF), 2008 WL 2787964, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 17,
2008).
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and held that the alleged derogatory comments did not “rise to the
requisite level of discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, or insult” to
sufficiently support a viable hostile work environment claim.137
Notably absent from these courts’ analyses is a recognition of
the serious implications that such comments have insofar as impos-
ing guilt by association, questioning the right of these plaintiffs to
be in the United States, and accusing them of affiliation with ene-
mies of the state based on his national origin and religion.
2. To Counteract the Court’s Failure to Appreciate the
Severity of Post-9/11 Discrimination, Plaintiffs Must
Show a High Frequency of Harassment to
Survive Summary Judgment
For plaintiffs to survive summary judgment, the racial slurs
and ethnic epithets must occur frequently for an extended period
of time and/or the plaintiff must face a threat of physical harm.
Ultimately, courts hold plaintiffs to a high standard for showing
that the objectionable behavior was sufficiently severe and perva-
sive notwithstanding that the offensive and humiliating ethnic slurs
and epithets are based on racist stereotypes. With the exception of
the Fourth Circuit in Sunbelt Rentals, few courts put the discrimina-
tory conduct in the post-9/11 context in which it took place, and
thus fail to realize the degree to which the workplace has been
infected with the conflation of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians
with terrorism.
In Yasin v. Cook County Sheriff’s Department, a male Arab Muslim
was subjected during a one-year period to over one hundred inci-
dents involving racial slurs about his ancestry and national origin
and racist graffiti on his locker.138 The plaintiff received telephone
calls and calls over the radio calling him a “sand nigga,” “terrorist,”
“camel jockey,” “shoe bomber,” and “Yasin Bin Laden.”139 Co-work-
ers posted a newspaper article regarding terrorism in America on
the plaintiff’s locker. Co-workers also remarked that the plaintiff
should “go back to his country” and “get out of America.” In early
137 Id at *9-10. See also Lahrichi v. Lumera Corp., No. CO4-2124C, 2006 WL 521659,
at *17 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 2, 2006) (referring to ethnic epithets against an Arab Ameri-
can and a practicing Muslim of Moroccan descent as “stupid” and the speaker as
possibly being “insensitive,” but finding the epithets insufficient to establish unlawful
discrimination by the defendant employer).
138 No. 07 C1266, 2009 WL 1210620, at *4 (N.D. Ill., May 4, 2009) (denying defend-
ants’ motion for summary judgment on grounds that the harassment met the severe
or pervasive standard, (citing Shanoff v. Illinois Dep’t of Human Servs., 258 F.3d 696,
704 (7th Cir. 2001)).
139 Id.
58 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:33
2005, a co-worker called the plaintiff on the radio and when he did
not respond, another co-worker commented that “he’s making a
bomb.” In denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the
court agreed with the plaintiff that such conduct was more than
merely objectionable and “the incessant remarks targeting Yasin—
such as ‘terrorist,’ ‘Hussein,’ ‘sand nigger,’ bin Laden,’ ‘shoe
bomber,’ and ‘camel jockey’—were discriminatory, insulting, and
humiliating.”140
In EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., a male Muslim African-Ameri-
can was often called “Taliban” and “towel head” by his cowork-
ers.141 Plaintiff was asked “are you on our side or are you on the
Taliban’s side,” and if “you don’t like America or where we stand,
you can just leave.”142 Furthermore, co-workers frequently made
fun of the plaintiff’s appearance, challenged his allegiance to the
United States, suggested he was a terrorist, and made comments
associating all Muslims with senseless violence.143 The plaintiff was
also the victim of several religiously charged incidents: the first of
which involved a co-worker who held a metal detector to the plain-
tiff’s head and after the detector did not go off, called the plaintiff
a “fake ass Muslim want-to-be turban wearing ass.”144 In a second
incident, the same co-worker showed the plaintiff a stapler and said
“if anyone upsets you pretend this stapler is a model airplane [and]
just toss it in the air, just repeatedly catch it, [and] don’t say any-
thing,”145 implying that the plaintiff was a terrorist because he was
a Muslim. A third incident involved a cartoon which was posted in
the public area depicting persons dressed in Islamic or Muslim at-
tire as suicide bombers. In response to the plaintiff’s complaints
and after an investigation, his supervisor advised the plaintiff not to
“take things so personal” and to maintain a positive attitude so that
these issues would “roll right off his shoulder and [he] could leave
work with the same positive attitude.”146 Similarly, a Muslim cus-
tomer was subject to a litany of other derogatory names such as
“Bin Laden,” “Hezbullah,” “Ayatollah,” “Kadaffi,” “Saddam Hus-
sein,” “terrorist,” and “sun nigger.”147
In finding that the plaintiff had suffered religious harassment
140 Id. (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
141 521 F.3d 306, 310 (4th Cir. 2008).
142 Id. at 316.
143 Id. at 310.
144 Id. at 311.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 312.
147 Id. at 317.
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that was “persistent, demeaning, unrelenting, and widespread,”148
the Fourth Circuit aptly noted “[i]t is impossible as an initial mat-
ter to ignore the context in which the harassment took place. In
the time immediately following September 11th, religious tensions
ran higher in much of the country, and Muslims were at times
viewed through the prism of 9/11, rather than as the individuals
they were.”149 To its credit, the Fourth Circuit noted what few other
courts regrettably have overlooked—that the government’s law en-
forcement efforts targeted against Muslims, Arabs, and South
Asians coupled with negative media portrayals contribute to palat-
able private bias that was expressed in the workplace.150 Ultimately,
the defendant’s habitual use of racial and ethnic epithets and the
cumulative effect of such resulted in a reversal of summary judg-
ment and a remand for the case to proceed to trial.151
3. Intersection of Religion and National Origin – Religious
and Ethnic Slurs Evince Conflation of Arabs and
Muslims with Terrorism
The number of religion-based charges filed with the EEOC in-
creased by 107% between 1992 and 2007 and were a record high in
2009.152 National origin discrimination charges also increased dur-
ing the same time period.153 A significant source of this increase
was caused by post-9/11 discrimination against individuals who are
or are perceived to be Muslim, Arab, South Asian, or Sikh.154 The
plaintiffs often suffered from a barrage of ethnic epithets and relig-
ious slurs that mirror glaring stereotypes in a post-9/11 security-
obsessed political environment in which persons having any associ-
ation with Islam are automatically suspect.
148 Id. at 316 (quoting Harris v. L & L Wings, Inc., 132 F.3d 978, 984 (4th Cir.
1997)).
149 Id. See also Olibrices v. State of Fla., 929 So. 2d 1176, 1180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2006) (“in the wake of September 11, 2001, and the ensuing War on Terror against
enemies who are thought fanatically Muslim and Arab or Persian in origin, the possi-
bility of group-based, individious discrimination against Pakistanis in this country is
not fanciful but real.”).
150 See Hing, supra note 8, at 449 (discussing how racial profiling by the government
and flawed reporting by the media has led Chinese American scientists to feel uncom-
fortable at work or pressured to quit).
151 EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F. 3d 306, 321 (4th Cir. 2008).
152 Naomi C. Earp, Forty-Three and Counting: EEOC’S Challenges and Successes and
Emerging Trends in the Employment Arena, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 133, 138 (Fall
2007); Tresa Baldas, EEPC: 2009 Discrimination Complaints Neared Record High, THE
NAT’L L. J. (Jan. 22, 2010), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=120243
7752762.
153 Earp, supra note 152, at 138; Baldas, supra note 152.
154 Earp, supra note 152, at 138.
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In one case, an Egyptian Muslim employee was frequently
called “Mrs. Osama bin Laden” and subjected to anti-Arab remarks,
including comments that Arabs and Muslims were “stupid” and
“crazy.”155 The employee, who had twenty years of company tenure,
complained to no avail and was ultimately terminated for reporting
the harassment.156 Another case involved a class of Muslim, Arab,
and South Asian employees who were subjected to offensive com-
ments about their religion and/or national origin, were called “ter-
rorist,” “Osama,” “Al Qaeda,” “Taliban,” and “dumb Muslim,” and
were cursed and accused of destroying the World Trade Center
and the country.157 Managers also wrote “Osama,” “Binladin,” “Al-
kada,” and “Taliban” instead of the employee’s names on work-re-
lated documents.158 Similarly, an East Indian Muslim employee was
repeatedly referred to as “Taliban” by employees and two managers
and asked “[w]hy don’t you go back to where you came from?”159
When the employee complained about the harassment to manage-
ment, they reportedly responded, “[d]on’t let it bother you” and
labeled him “a Muslim extremist” shortly before firing him.160
These cases along with a volume of others demonstrate the perva-
siveness of stereotypes conflating Arabs and Muslims with terror-
ism. The implications are profound because the employee’s loyalty
to the country, and by extension to the employer, is called into
question, thereby treating him as a fifth column161 deserving of sus-
picion and surveillance.
In Alhalabi v. Missouri Department of Natural Resources, an Arab
American won a favorable jury verdict for his claims of national
origin harassment based on ethnicity and religion.162 Plaintiff
started receiving harassing treatment very soon after he started in
155 EEOC Litigation Settlement Report, Litigation Settlements (July 2004), available
at http://archive.eeoc.gov/litigation/settlements/settlement07-04.html.
156 Press Release, EEOC, Poggenpohl U.S. to Pay $162,500 to Settle National Ori-
gin and Religious Discrimination Lawsuit (June 29, 2004) (on file with author).
157 Press Release, EEOC, The Plaza Hotel to Pay $525,000 for Post-9/11 Backlash
Discrimination Against Employees (June 8, 2005), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/
press/6-8-05.html.
158 Id.
159 Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Sues Houston-Area Car Dealership for Post-9/11
Backlash Discrimination (Aug. 25, 2004) (on file with author).
160 Id.
161 Merriam-Webster defines “fifth column” as: “a group of secret sympathizers or
supporters of an enemy that engage in espionage or sabotage within defense lines or
national border.” Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/fifth%20column, (last visited Dec. 1, 2009).
162 Former employee proves hostile work enviornment, Mo. Lawyers Wkly. (Mo. Lawyers
Media, St. Louis, Mo.) Sept. 1, 2008.
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1991, and the harassment worsened after September 11.163 The
harassment included posting jokes about Arabs and Muslims and
repeated postings of inflammatory articles about the Iraq war.164
The plaintiff also received anonymous notes and flyers in his
mailbox accusing him of being a terrorist and telling him that “his
kind” was not wanted in the office.165
In EEOC v. WC&M Enterprises, Inc., a Muslim salesman of In-
dian origin suffered a barrage of hostile behavior from co-workers
and supervisors.166 When the plaintiff arrived for his afternoon
shift on September 11, 2001, his co-workers and supervisors mock-
ingly asked him where he had been, implying that he had partici-
pated in the terrorist attacks against the United States.167
Subsequently, he faced mocking comments about his dietary re-
strictions and prayer rituals.168 His co-workers called him “Taliban”
multiple times per day despite the plaintiff’s objections and com-
plaints to his supervisors.169 The plaintiff’s supervisor issued a writ-
ten warning that the plaintiff was acting like a “Muslim extremist”
and that he could not work with him because of his “militant
stance.”170 In response to the plaintiff’s request not to attend a
meeting with the United Way that had no connection with his job,
the supervisor stated, “This is America. That’s the way things work
over here. This is not the Islamic country where you came from.”171
A co-worker asked the plaintiff “Why don’t you go back where you
came from since you believe what you believe?”172 The plaintiff also
heard numerous comments suggesting that he was involved in the
September 11th terrorist attacks and that he was a member of the
Taliban because he, like members of the Taliban, was a Muslim.173
Although the plaintiff had not lost sales as a result of the alleged
harassment, the Fifth Circuit noted that Title VII’s prohibition “is
not limited to ‘economic’ or ‘tangible’ discrimination”.174 In con-
trast to other cases alleging hostile work environment based on
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 See BNA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION REPORT, Vol. 31 No. 07, ARAB AMERICAN
SUPERVISOR WINS $337,000 FOR HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT IN STATE WORKPLACE (Aug. 13,
2008).
166 EEOC v. WC&M Enters., Inc., 496 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2007).
167 Id. at 396.
168 Id.
169 Id. 396-97.
170 Id. at 397.
171 Id. at 396.
172 Id. at 397.
173 Id. at 401.
174 Id. at 399 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)).
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similar harassing conduct, the Fifth Circuit reversed summary judg-
ment and remanded the case for trial.175
In Khan v. United Recovery Systems, Inc., a female Pakistani Mus-
lim alleged she was harassed and discriminated against because of
her sex, religion, and national origin.176 Shortly after the Septem-
ber 11th terrorist attacks, a co-worker told the plaintiff “all Muslims
should be killed because they are f—-ing terrorists, that he wished
all these Muslims were wiped off of the face of the earth, and that
when he entered a convenience store and saw a Middle Eastern
store clerk he wanted to shoot the bastard.”177 The co-worker made
fun of Muslim male names and brought a binder to work display-
ing pictures of Arabic men that he defaced with a black marker. He
warned the plaintiff that she should remove her necklace display-
ing the word “Allah” because she “might just get shot if she kept
wearing it.”178 He made these hostile and vicious comments, while
standing extremely close to the plaintiff, pointing his finger di-
rectly at her face, and raising his voice.179 When the plaintiff at-
tempted to appease the co-worker, he responded that “he was
racist and proud of it and that it was his God-given right as an
American.”180 Another co-worker harassed the plaintiff as he re-
peatedly gave the plaintiff newspaper articles regarding mosques in
Afghanistan that taught terrorism, attached a note telling her to
explain such activity, and demanded that she tell him what she was
being taught at the mosque she attended in Houston, implying
that it too was teaching terrorism.181
Despite the plaintiff’s repeated complaints over months, she
was told to stop complaining and focus on her job because all the
complaining was making her look bad.182 The Court denied defen-
dant’s motion for summary judgment and found the remarks to
the plaintiff to be malicious, vitriolic, and pervasive, thus meeting
the severe and pervasive standard.183 The Court acknowledged the
plaintiff’s fear for her personal safety and the anxiety attacks she
suffered as a result of the hostile work environment.184 For pur-
poses of the plaintiff’s § 1981 claim, the court accepted Pakistani
175 Id. at 402.





181 Id. at *2.
182 Id. at *3.
183 Id. at *18.
184 Id. at *16-17.
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origin as a proxy for race and stated “[w]hen a plaintiff asserts that
he has suffered discrimination based on membership in a group
that is commonly perceived as ‘racial’ because it is ethnically and
physiognomically distinct, we will treat the case as asserting a claim
under § 1981 whether he labels that discrimination as based on
‘national origin’ or on ‘race.’”185
In Salem v. Heritage Square, Inc., a female Jordanian American
alleged discrimination on account of her ethnicity and purported
religion.186 Although she was Christian, her Arab heritage caused
her colleagues to believe she was Muslim and they harassed her
accordingly.187 Co-workers asked the plaintiff whether she knew
how people could engage in the September 11th terrorist attacks
and commented that she might have appeared in news of the at-
tacks.188 The plaintiff was made to feel “less American” as her lan-
guage skills and ability to read were repeatedly questioned merely
because she was fluent in Arabic.189 Because a foreign accent falls
within the EEOC definition of a “linguistic characteristic of na-
tional origin group,” proof that a plaintiff is discriminated against
because of a foreign accent establishes a prima facie case of na-
tional origin discrimination.190 Plaintiffs’ colleagues questioned
her loyalty to the United States by accusing her of being unable to
assimilate into American culture.191 The plaintiff was also in-
structed not to speak Arabic with customers as this was deemed
unprofessional and inappropriate.192 The Court considered the to-
tality of the circumstances and denied the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment.193
In Hafford v. Seidner, the Court granted summary judgment for
the employer on a religious harassment claim despite evidence that
a supervisor had accused the plaintiff of preparing for a “holy war,”
mocked the Muslim greeting, and commented that the Muslim re-
ligion taught its followers to hate white people.194 The court held
185 Id. at *19 (quoting Jatoi v. Hurst-Euless-Bedford Hosp. Auth., 807 F.2d 1214
(5th Cir. 1987)).
186 No. CIV.A.06-4691 (WHA), 2007 WL 2555513, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2007).
187 Id. at *3.
188 Id. at *4.
189 Id. at *9.
190 Bell v. Home Life Ins. Co., 596 F. Supp. 1549, 1553 (M.D.N.C. 1984); see also
Carino v. Univ. of Okla. Bd. of Regents, 750 F.2d 815, 816 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding
that discrimination based on a foreign accent may be probative of an intent to dis-
criminate on the basis of national origin).
191 Salem, 2007 WL 2555513, at *3.
192 Id.
193 Id. at *12.
194 183 F.3d 506, 514 (6th Cir. 1999).
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that such behavior was insufficient to show a hostile work
environment.195
In Hyath v. City of Decatur, a co-worker repeatedly referred to
the Muslim plaintiff by the nickname of “Taliban” and “Al Qaeda”
and teased the plaintiff about how Muslims dress and the plaintiff’s
dietary restrictions.196 During a routine police training session in
which new recruits, including the plaintiff, were exposed to pepper
spray, a co-worker stated “[t]hat’s what you get for bombing us you
damn Taliban.”197 Another co-worker then superimposed the
plaintiff’s photo onto an FBI poster seeking information about a
suspected Islamic terrorist and posted it in the office.198 In re-
sponse to the employee’s belated complaints, the employer con-
ducted an internal investigation and concluded that the comments
were merely a form of inappropriate joking and not meant to be
malicious.199 The Court agreed and granted the defendant sum-
mary judgment.200 The court opined that even though the plaintiff
was offended, the comments occurred in the context of pervasive
“nicknames, joking, and teasing” within the police department as
opposed to an atmosphere “[c]harged with racial hostility.”201 The
court unduly relied on Baker v. Alabama Department of Public Safety,
wherein the court found that a computer image depicting the
plaintiff as an Arab terrorist was not sufficiently severe to create a
hostile work environment.202
The Court in Hyath emphasized the difference between intimi-
dation and merely offensive utterances or teasing.203 The Court
concluded that the racial epithets in Hyath were more akin to racial
symbols and slurs including the presence of rebel flags, the letters
“KKK” in the workplace, and comments referring to an African
American employee as “nigger” or “boy,” which despite their offen-
siveness did not constitute sufficiently severe or pervasive harass-
ment to alter the conditions of employment.204 When compared to
195 Id.
196 No. CIV.A.1:04-1135 (JEC), 2006 WL 825779, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 2006).
197 Id.
198 Id. at *2.
199 Id.
200 Id. at *20.
201 Id. at *6.
202 Baker v. Ala. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1309 (M.D. Ala. 2003).
203 Hyath v. Decatur, No. CIV.A.1:04-1135 (JEC), 2006 WL 825779, at *7-13 (N.D.
Ga. Mar. 28, 2006).
204 Id. at *8 (comparing the facts to Barrow v. Georgia Pacific Corp., No. 04-10937,
2005 WL 1926420 (11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2005)); but see Zebari v. Pepsi Bottling Co., No.
05-CV-72924, 2007 WL 1041199 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 5, 2007) (finding plaintiff’s expres-
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Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, where the Eleventh Circuit found suffi-
cient evidence that racial epithets were severe when plaintiff’s fore-
man called him a “spic,” “wetback,” and “Mexican motherfucker”
in an intimidating manner while arguing with plaintiff or berating
him for his job performance,205 the Court focused more on
whether the environment was physically hostile as opposed to the
degree of offensiveness of the racial epithets.206
As shown in the cases discussed above, national origin harass-
ment against Arabs and South Asians often occurs in conjunction
with religious harassment. The harassers conflate the ethnic Arab
or South Asian with the religious identity of Muslim, resulting in
religiously driven racial discrimination. Not only can such actions
be a basis for national origin discrimination pursuant to Title VII,
but are also actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
B. Claims of Ethnic or National Origin Harassment Under
Section 1981
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et
seq., assures all persons in this country the same right “as is enjoyed
by white citizens” to make and enforce contracts.207 Section 1981 of
this Act provides a federal remedy for private acts of racial discrimi-
nation in employment as an alternative to remedies available
under Title VII.208 Section 1981 provides a number of advantages
in litigating racial harassment claims. For claims brought under
§ 1981, the statute of limitations may be the four-year-catchall en-
acted under 28 U.S.C. § 1658 or the most analogous statute of limi-
tations period applied by the state in which the federal court sits.209
This is considerably less restrictive for plaintiffs when compared to
the 300-day maximum time period to submit a charge under Title
VII.210 Since there is no EEOC charge filing requirement, it pro-
vides an important basis for redress where the employee has not
sion of satisfaction with his work during the same period he suffered from ethnic
epithets undermined his harassment claims).
205 Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, 277 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2002).
206 Hyath, 2006 WL 825779, at *8.
207 Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006).
208 See, e.g., Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975); see also
Danco, Inc., v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 178 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1998) (evidencing an in-
stance in which § 1981 gave an independent contractor a racial harassment claim,
and by extension a national origin claim, based on the theory behind a hostile work
environment claim available to an employee under an ordinary employment
contract).
209 See Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382 (2004).
210 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (e)(1) (2006).
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filed a charge within the 180 to 300 day charge filing period, or
when there are charge filing deficiencies, which may not become
apparent until discovery is conducted in the case. Further, there
are no caps on punitive and compensatory damages, as compared
to Title VII, which caps such damages at a maximum of $300,000,
depending on the size of the employer.211 Additionally, § 1981 cov-
ers employers regardless of the number of employees, compared to
Title VII’s coverage of private employers, which requires fifteen or
more employees.212
Race has been defined broadly to cover immigrant ethnic
groups even though national origin discrimination is not within
the scope of § 1981.213 “The concept of race under § 1981 is broad.
It extends to matters of ancestry which are normally associated with
nationality, not race in a biological sense.”214 Title VII does not
contain a definition of “race,” nor has the EEOC adopted one.215
Courts have recognized that race is a social construct rather than a
fixed and biologically defined group.216 Title VII prohibits discrim-
ination not just because of one protected trait, such as race, but
also because of the “intersection of two or more protected bases”
such as race and national origin. The Ninth Circuit noted “where
two bases for discrimination exist, they cannot be neatly reduced to
distinct components,” because to do so “often distorts or ignores
the particular nature of the [plaintiffs’] experiences.”217 The Sec-
ond Circuit has recognized that “[a]lthough there may be funda-
mental conceptual differences between race and national origin
discrimination ‘prejudice is as irrational as is the selection of
groups against whom it is directed,’ thus we cannot simply assume
that employment discrimination invariably fits into neat, clearly
distinct legal categories.”218
211 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (b)(3) (2006).
212 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b) (2006).
213 Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir. 2004).
214 Daemi v. Church’s Fried Chicken, Inc., 931 F.2d 1379, 1387 n.7 (10th Cir.
1991).
215 EEOC Compliance Manual § 15-II (2006).
216 See, e.g., Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazrahi, 481 U.S. 604, 610 n.4 (1987) (discuss-
ing scientific and anthropological authorities arguing that “race” is a social con-
struct); United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 177 n.12 (2d Cir. 2002) (stating that
“the modern usage [of race] may well itself be a fiction, in the sense that it groups
people into what are no more than socially constructed categories.”).
217 Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1561-62 (9th Cir. 1994) (claim alleging
discrimination based on race and sex are not “distinct elements amenable to almost
mathematical treatment.”).
218 Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 202 n.5 (2d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted) (quot-
ing Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968, 971 (10th Cir. 1979)).
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The U.S. Census Bureau for decades has classified persons
originating from Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa as
White.219 For purposes of collection of federal data on race and
ethnicity, the Office of Management and Budget now uses five ra-
cial categories: American Indian or Alaska Native; Asian; Black or
African American; Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander; and
White; and one ethnicity category, Hispanic or Latino.220 The
OMB has made clear that these “social-political constructs . . .
should not be interpreted as being genetic, biological, or anthro-
pological in nature.”221 The census and its complicated history il-
lustrate the inconsistent and evolving treatment of “racial”
categories, as the Census has utilized “racial” categories that have
been based on a mixture of concepts including color (White or
Black), national origin (e.g., Korean) and state of origin (e.g., Ha-
waiian).222 As negative stereotypes and biases post-9/11 are often
directed at a person’s race and national origin at the same time, an
appreciation for the nature of this prejudice as well as the histori-
cal or cultural background of such prejudice is critical to acknowl-
edging the severity of the discrimination.
While the Supreme Court has not ruled directly on whether
employment discrimination claims based on national origin can be
brought pursuant to § 1981, Justice Brennan, in his concurring
opinion in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, highlighted that the
distinction between discrimination based on ancestry or ethnic
characteristics and that based on place of birth is difficult to
make.223 Nevertheless, some lower federal courts have established a
general rule that matters of racial discrimination are the only mat-
ters encompassed within § 1981, and they lack jurisdiction to con-
sider suits under that statute based solely on national origin
219 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, PRO-
VISIONAL GUIDANCE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1997 STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL




222 See Sharona Hoffman, Is There A Place For “Race” As a Legal Concept?, 36 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1093, 1132-1133 (2004), which observes that since 1900, the census has utilized at
least 26 different “race”-related terms to categorize the population. In 1977, the basic
categories were: Black, Hispanic, White, American Indian or Alaskan Native, and
Asian or Pacific Islander. These categories were criticized as flawed and inconsistent.
For example, “Black” was the only group defined by reference to “race,” whereas “His-
panic” was defined by reference to national origin. “Asian or Pacific Islander” and
“White” were characterized by geographic origin, while “American Indian or Alaskan
Native” was only for those with a cultural identification with the community.
223 Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazrahi, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987).
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discrimination claims.224 Other courts, however, take a common-
sense approach based on the factual practicalities indicating racial
bias against certain groups of distinct national origin.225 All rele-
vant factors in determining whether members of their national ori-
gin group are “discriminated against because they are somehow
different as compared to ‘white citizens’” are considered.226 Courts
acknowledge there is “a degree of identity between claims of na-
tional origin or ethnic background discrimination and racial dis-
crimination,”227 thereby rejecting fixed and rigid racial
classifications based on quantitative criteria such as “educational
achievements, mean earnings, or anthropological racial classifica-
tions.”228 Hence allegations of discrimination based on ancestry
coupled with a racial harassment claim are sufficient to properly
bring the complaint within the ambit of § 1981.229
Discrimination based on color qualifies as racial discrimina-
tion under § 1981, and as a result numerous cases have held that
Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, or East Indians can sue under
§ 1981.230 Persons of South Asian descent may also pursue racial
harassment claims under § 1981. Hispanics are likely covered be-
cause they are frequently identified as “non-whites.”231 In 1987, the
Supreme Court recognized Arab descent as a “race” for purposes
224 See, e.g., Ohemeng v. Del. State Coll., 676 F. Supp. 65 (D. Del. 1988); Chaiffetz v.
Robertson Research Holding, Ltd., 798 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1986); Nieto v. United Auto
Workers Local 598, 672 F.Supp. 987 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Von Zuckerstein v. Argonne
Nat’l Lab., 984 F.2d 1467 (7th Cir. 1993).
225 Sokolski v. Corning Glass Works, No. 77-35, 1977 WL 15487 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 10,
1977) (stating “[t]he terms ‘race’ and ‘racial discrimination’ may be of such doubtful
sociological validity as to be scientifically meaningless, but these terms nonetheless are
subject to a commonly-accepted, albeit sometimes vague, understanding” and re-
jecting Slavic, Italian, or Jewish origin as an actionable basis under § 1981).
226 Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968, 971 (10th Cir. 1979).
227 Aponte v. Nat’l Steel Serv. Ctr., 500 F. Supp. 198, 202 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (citing
Garcia v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Med. Ctr., 80 F.R.D. 254, 263 (N.D. Ill. 1978)).
228 Banker v. Time Chemical, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 1183, 1186 (N.D. Ill. 1983); see also
Budinsky v. Corning Glass Works, 425 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
229 Budinsky, 425 F. Supp. at 788.
230 Van Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that
Mexican-Americans of brown race or color can sue under § 1981), vacated on other
grounds, 440 U.S. 625 (1979); Hernandez v. Erlenbusch, 368 F. Supp. 752 (D. Or.
1973); Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 1142 (S.D. Tex. 1973), aff’d in part
and remanded in part on other grounds, 516 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1975); Banker v. Time
Chemical, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 1183, 1186 nn.2-3 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (citing cases holding
that East Indians qualified as a race for purposes of § 1981 and rejecting reliance on
educational backgrounds or financial affluence as factors to consider in defining
race).
231 Banker, 579 F. Supp. at 1184. But see Davis v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 560
(D.C. Ga. 1985) (rejecting that all Hispanics, as a group, are subject to racial
discrimination).
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of § 1981.232 Because of the courts’ inconsistent treatment of na-
tional origin harassment, it is imperative that an Arab plaintiff al-
lege harassment on account of race if seeking relief under § 1981,
even if the harassment was verbalized in the form of national origin
discrimination.233
A 2005 case before the Ninth Circuit234 addressed a racial har-
assment claim brought under § 1981 by a plaintiff of Arab ances-
try.235 In El-Hakem v. BJY, Inc., the Court affirmed the finding that
the CEO’s refusal to call Mamdouh El-Hakem by his name and in-
sistence on calling him “Manny” or “Hank” at least once a week in
meetings and twice a month for a year created a racially hostile
environment in violation of § 1981.236 Despite the plaintiff’s stren-
uous and repeated objections, the CEO insisted on calling the
Egyptian Muslim male employee by a non-Arabic name because a
“Western” name would increase the plaintiff’s chances of success in
the company and would be more acceptable to the company’s cli-
entele.237 The Court noted that “a distinctive physiognomy is not
essential to qualify for § 1981 protection,”238 thereby protecting
“persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely be-
cause of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics.”239 Further evinc-
ing that names are often a proxy for race and ethnicity, plaintiff
testified, “[m]y name is Mamdouh and it’s pronounced Mamdouh,
and I want you to call me Mamdouh. My name means things to me.
It is part of my identity. It is part of my personality. It is my name. I
carry it for fourty-four [sic] years. And it’s part of my religion, and I
need to be used and called by the name Mamdouh, which is the
name I’m given by my parents.”240
In another case in 2007, an Afghan woman was subjected to
232 See Saint Francis Coll. v. Al Khazraji, 48 U.S. 604, 613 (1987).
233 See El-Zabet v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 2006 FED App. 0929N (6th Cir.) (Jordanian
American alleged harassment based on national origin and made no mention of ra-
cial harassment, resulting in dismissal of § 1981 claim).
234 El-Hakem v. BJY, Inc., 415 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2005).
235 See Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. 604 (demonstrating that although persons from
the Arab Middle East and North Africa are categorized as Caucasian by the U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau and in standard Equal Employment Opportunity forms, Arab descent
qualifies as a “race” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
236 El-Hakem, 415 F.3d at 1074. See also Mihoubi v. Caribou Coffee Co., No.
CIV.A.1:05-CV-2441(TWT), 2007 WL 2331061 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 10, 2007) (although
accepting Algerian Muslim plaintiff as a protected class under § 1981, rejecting hos-
tile work environment claim due to plaintiff’s failure to complain or indicate disap-
proval of ethnic slurs and engaging in self-deprecating jokes about being Algerian).
237 El-Hakem, 415 F.3d at 1071.
238 Id. at 1073 (citing Saint Francis Coll. 481 U.S. at 613).
239 Id.
240 Andrew M. Milz, But Names Will Never Hurt Me?: El-Hakem v. BJY, Inc. and Title VII
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unwelcome and offensive intimidation, ridicule, and insults be-
cause of her Afghan origin.241 The plaintiff worked as a role-player
in simulations with U.S. servicemen prior to their deployment to
Afghanistan.242 During her employment, she was forced to reside
in barracks infested with cockroaches and rodents and lacking air
conditioning in dangerously hot conditions.243 When she com-
plained about the inhumane conditions, her supervisor yelled at
her and physically attacked her.244 He told her to shut up and
stated that if women did not speak English they did not deserve
better.245 She was told to be thankful for having food and a roof
over her head because people in Afghanistan did not even have
that.246 Although Afghans are not Arabs, the court conflated Arabs
and Afghans in applying the Al-Khazraji standard, and found that
racial discrimination was present.247 In addition to demonstrating
the cruel harassment faced by some Muslim, Arab, or South Asian
employees, this case exemplifies the courts’ general ignorance of
the difference between someone of Arab, Persian, Afghan, Indian,
or Pakistani origin, which more often than not is disadvantageous
to the plaintiffs’ claims. Therefore, when developing a case strat-
egy, lawyers should take this general lack of knowledge into ac-
count and ensure the court is adequately educated on the context
in which the national origin harassment is taking place.
VI. CONCLUSION
The cases discussed in this Article show that accusations of be-
ing a terrorist, ethnic slurs about the plaintiff’s Arab heritage, or
allegations of condoning violence based on a profession of the Is-
lamic faith have become a pernicious staple in some workplaces.
The purported parody behind the “jokes” reflects a deep-seated
distrust and suspicion of the worker based solely on her religion,
ethnic origin, and race. In the post-9/11 context, the harassment
questions an employee’s loyalty, both to the employer and to the
nation, thereby causing co-workers to feel justified in their mis-
treatment of the plaintiff. In effect a de-Americanization process,
Liability For Race Discrimination Based on an Employee’s Name, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS.
L. REV. 283, 285 (2006).
241 Rafiq v. SMI Global Mission Support, Inc., No. 2:06CV1332, 2007 WL 433163, at





246 Id. at *3.
247 Id. at *5.
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the Muslim, Arab, or South Asian employee’s right to be in the
United States and by extension in that particular workplace be-
comes suspect. She is treated like a fifth column in the workplace
worthy of derision and suspicion. This private misconduct is rein-
forced by, if not a direct result of, governmental racial profiling,
watchlisting, and targeted law enforcement initiatives that continue
well into 2009. Eight years after the attacks, polls reflect continued
misunderstanding of Islam and Arabs that further contributes to
negative stereotypes.248 Fifty-three percent of Americans, for exam-
ple, express a “not too favorable” or “not favorable at all” opinion
about Islam.249 Cumulatively, this translates into feelings of second-
class citizenship and powerlessness in the face of pervasive public
bias, interposed into the workplace, against communities plagued
by entrenched post-9/11 stereotypes.
The aforementioned cases also raise questions regarding
whether courts are too quick to dismiss the harassment as stray re-
marks because of what judges deem to be excusable ignorance or
protected political viewpoints about Arab cultures, Islam, and the
Middle East, as opposed to actionable harassment based on mali-
cious discriminatory intent. The “blame the victim” approach often
taken by employers, such as in Sunbelt Rentals and Khan where the
employee’s responses are characterized as oversensitive and exag-
gerated, should be rejected by the courts. Although Title VII is not
meant to police every offensive comment that occurs in the work-
place, the courts should recognize that racial slurs, ethnic epithets,
and other forms of discrimination directed at Muslims, Arabs, Mid-
dle Easterners, and South Asians are often based on racist stereo-
types, as well as implicit biases,250 that impede equal opportunity in
the workplace. Unlike other minority groups in the United States,
there are few positive depictions of Arabs, Muslims, Middle Eas-
terners, and South Asians to offset the plethora of negative stereo-
types perpetuated through the media and in government policies.
As a result, an individual employee is faced with the insurmounta-
248 See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MUSLIM AMERICANS: MIDDLE CLASS AND MOSTLY MAIN-
STREAM 36 (May 22, 2007), http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.
pdf.
249 Gallup, supra note 20.
250 Priyamvada Sinha, Police Use of Race in Suspect Descriptions: Constitutional Considera-
tions, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 131, 148 (2006) (stating that in the Implicit
Association Test developed by scientists Brian Nosek, Mahzarin Banaji, and Tony
Greenwald at Harvard University, over two-thirds of non-Arab, non-Muslim test-takers
showed biases against Arab Muslims).
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ble burden of convincing co-workers inundated with such stereo-
types that he or she is an exception and thus deserving of equal
opportunity in the workplace.
